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Institutional Investors, Past Performance, and
Dynamic Loss Aversion
Paul G. J. O’Connell and Melvyn Teo∗
Abstract
Using a proprietary database of currency trades, this paper explores the effects of trad-
ing gains and losses on risk-taking among large institutional investors. We find that in-
stitutional investors, unlike individuals, are not prone to the disposition effect. Instead,
institutions aggressively reduce risk following losses and mildly increase risk following
gains. This asymmetry is more pronounced later in the calendar year and among older
and more experienced funds. We show that such performance dependence is consistent
with dynamic loss aversion (Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)) and overconfidence. In
addition, prior institutional gains and losses have palpable implications for future prices.
I. Introduction
The link between risk-taking and short-term past performance receives short
shrift in the classical, rational finance literature. As Coval and Shumway (2005)
put it, in a setting where fully rational traders have standard Von Neumann-
Morgenstern expected utility, profit opportunities are uncorrelated across the trad-
ing day, wealth effects are negligible, margin constraints are unimportant, traders’
compensation and reputation concerns are neutral, and profits are not related to
future trading activity. In other words, past performance should not matter.
Using a proprietary currency trades database, this paper shows that past per-
formance manifestly affects the risk-taking behavior of large institutional man-
agers. However, the sign of the effect differs from what has been observed for
∗O’Connell, paul.oconnell@fdopartners.com, FDO Partners LLC, 5 Revere St., Cambridge, MA
02138; and Teo, melvynteo@smu.edu.sg, Singapore Management University, 50 Stamford Rd., Sin-
gapore 178899, Singapore. We are particularly indebted to Jeremy Stein and Nick Barberis for many
valuable insights and suggestions. We also thank Dennis Bams, Joshua Coval (the referee), Ken Froot,
Joel Hasbrouck, Daniel Kahneman, and seminar participants at State Street Associates and the 2004
European Finance Association meetings. We greatly appreciate the help of State Street Corporation
in obtaining the institutional trades data and the financial support of the Wharton-SMU Research
Center.
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retail investors and professional traders. Unlike such investors, the institutional
investors in our sample do not seem susceptible to disposition effects. On the
contrary, they aggressively reduce risk in the wake of losses and mildly increase
risk in the wake of gains. Moreover, any increases in risk-taking are short-lived,
reversing themselves within a calendar quarter. These basic results are pervasive
across the major currencies and characterize some 91% of the trading volume in
our sample.
We consider a host of explanations, including currency hedging activity, mar-
gin and capital constraints, stop-loss trading (Osler (2003)), momentum trading,
managerial compensation and reputation concerns (Chevalier and Ellison (1997)),
and the disposition effect (Odean (1998)), but find evidence suggesting that these
explanations cannot account for the bulk of the performance dependence we ob-
serve. The fact that the risk-performance relationship is strong for pure currency
funds and for long-only positions indicates that currency hedging is not at its root.
Margin and capital constraints cannot explain the results, since cross-currency
effects within funds are noticeably absent. Stop-loss trading would imply that the
risk-performance relationship is driven by large losses, yet the risk reaction to
losses persists over a wide range of small losses. Return momentum and herding
proxies fail to drive out the explanatory power of past gains and losses on risk-
taking. Finally, theories based on compensation concerns and the disposition
effect predict the opposite risk reaction to past performance.
Instead, the sign of the effects is more in keeping with the theories of dy-
namic loss aversion1 (Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)) and overconfidence
(Barber and Odean (2001)). The results dovetail with the view that institutional
investors are more likely than individual investors to base their sense of self-
worth on their ability to invest. Unlike retail investors or professional traders
who trade for their own accounts, institutional investors manage other people’s
money, and their past performance records are often publicly available. Hence,
we argue that they are more likely than other investors to derive utility from past
performance and to be loss averse. We show that consistent with this, they react
strongly to losses occurring at the end of the calendar year, which translate more
swiftly to embarrassment for the manager. Also, consistent with an overconfi-
dence explanation, fund age and trading experience attenuate the risk reaction to
gains.
In addition, the observed performance dependence has tangible implications
for future returns. Because funds with losses are more eager to reduce currency
exposure, a one-standard-deviation increase in the losses from long versus short
positions, scaled by past trading volume, induces a 3.6% standard deviation or a
2.1 basis point (bp) decrease in returns the next day. Conversely, because funds
with gains are more eager to increase exposure, an increase in the gains from
long versus short positions precipitates an increase in returns the next day. These
price effects are statistically significant (t-statistics= 3.32 and 2.50, respectively),
robust to controls for past currency returns, and start to dissipate within a week.
They are also stronger for pure currency funds than for other funds. Further,
1This is also frequently referred to as the house money effect (see Thaler and Johnson (1990)).
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simple long/short trading strategies based on yesterday’s gains and losses can
generate returns in excess of 7% per year and information ratios close to one.
One caveat, however, is that the returns from such strategies may not survive the
transaction costs associated with daily rebalancing.
This paper offers fresh insights into the trading behavior of institutional in-
vestors and challenges the classical finance view that behavioral biases are “an
annoying but essentially harmless anomaly, confined to retail investors and ex-
perimental subjects” (Locke and Mann (2005)). In doing so, we build on several
themes. Odean (1998), Feng and Seasholes (2005), and Dhar and Zhu (2006)
show that retail investors tend to hold onto their losses and quickly cash out their
gains. That is, they are prone to the disposition effect. Coval and Shumway (2005)
and Locke and Mann (2005) document a similar trading pattern with professional
traders at the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). We show that the disposition effect
results are sensitive to investor type. Unlike other investors, institutional investors
are, on average, immune to the disposition effect. They tend to ride their gains
and quickly cut their losses. Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) propose a model
based on dynamic loss aversion that simultaneously explains the equity premium,
volatility, and predictability puzzles in finance. Our results are consistent with
their model predictions and complement evidence from gambling experiments
(Thaler and Johnson (1990)). List (2003) documents that the Thaler (1980) en-
dowment effect diminishes with trading experience, while Haigh and List (2005)
show that despite having greater trading experience, CBOT traders tend to suffer
from greater myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler (1995)) than do under-
graduates in a laboratory setting. Our results on trading experience resonate with
those of List (2003) and challenge those of Haigh and List (2005). Brown, Har-
low, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) argue that, motivated
by career concerns, managers in growth-oriented funds tend to increase volatil-
ity in the second half of the year if performance has been poor in the first half
of the year. Our tests suggest that behavioral biases can induce an opposite reac-
tion to losses in the nearer term (e.g., at daily and weekly horizons). Our results on
price implications corroborate recent evidence by Coval and Shumway (2005) and
Frazzini (2006), who show that behavioral biases have tangible implications for
future prices. Finally, our findings are supportive of narrow framing amongst in-
stitutions, which is comforting in light of the Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006)
argument that only preferences exhibiting narrow framing are consistent with the
equity premium and stock market participation puzzles.
Despite the importance of institutional investors as an investor class, to our
knowledge, the only other study that investigates high-frequency trading behavior
amongst institutions2 is Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). They explore perfor-
mance dependence among investors (including institutional investors) in the
Finnish stock market. Our study differs from theirs in three ways. First, they do
2Frazzini (2006) and Wermers (1999) analyze low-frequency mutual fund quarterly equity hold-
ings and find evidence of the disposition effect. We argue that since active currency holdings are further
removed from the underlying stakeholders (who, in mutual funds, are typically retail investors) than
equity holdings, the currency trades data may be a more suitable place to search for behavioral biases
amongst institutional managers.
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158 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
not distinguish from explanations peculiar to institutions like managerial career
concerns. Controlling for these explanations has been crucial in allowing us to
isolate any behavioral effects. Second, unlike Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001),
we generate impulse response functions from a vector autoregression (VAR) to
precisely trace out the evolution of the risk/performance relationship over time.
Third and most importantly, in contrast to Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), we find
evidence inconsistent with the disposition effect. The difference in results cannot
be simply traced to methodology, as we also employ the logit regressions used in
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001).3
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the data.
Section III presents the basic empirical results linking risk-taking to past per-
formance. Section IV discusses the various explanations for our findings, while
Section V explores the implications for prices. Section VI concludes.
II. Data
The data are provided by State Street Corporation, the world’s largest custo-
dian. State Street clients are primarily large global institutional money managers,
and the total of all funds serviced by State Street at the end of our sample was $8.4
trillion, approximately 15% of total global assets. Our sample spans from January
1, 1994 to December 31, 2002, and comprises over eight million individual trade
records undertaken by 7,541 anonymous funds.
To construct the risk and P&L series for each fund and each currency, we first
derive fund holdings by cumulating flows. Each day, net flows by currency, fund,
and tenor are measured. All flows on date t with tenor s are converted to dollars
by dividing by the appropriate forward currency exchange rate f st , where f is in
units of foreign currency per dollar, adjusted to reflect present value using the one-
month U.S. dollar LIBOR interest rate. Spot and forward rates are collected from
WM Reuters at the 4:00 PM London close each day. Forward rates are collected
for tenors of one, two, three, six, and 12 months, and geometrically interpolated to
generate valuation rates for trades of any maturity up to one year. The U.S. dollar
LIBOR is also collected from Reuters. If a trade takes place that does not include
the U.S. dollar (such as a sterling/yen trade), it is broken down into two separate
trades or “legs” against the dollar prior to valuation.
Holdings can then be built up by cumulating these flows, after adjusting for
mark-to-market gains and losses on each day’s pre-existing positions. Any trades
that take place before the start of our database will be missed in the integration
of trades up to holdings. However, since over 99% of the trades in our database
have a duration or tenor of less than one year, the holdings series will be accurate
after the first year of integration. Hence, all the analyses in the paper are done on
post-1994 data. To construct holdings, for a position with tenor s on date t − 1,
3Also, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) base their disposition results on only the behavior of local
Finnish institutions (see their Section I and Table I) that may be less sophisticated (and hence more
prone to the disposition effect) than the institutional investors examined in our sample.
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the marked-to-market gross return between date t − 1 and t is f s−1t /f st−1. So, for
currency k at time t, holdings are calculated as
hk,t =
S∑
s=0
(
hsk,t−1
f sk,t
f s+1k,t−1
+ bsk,t − d sk,t
)
,
where b is net buying and d captures the spot settlement or delivery, both on
date t. Spot delivery occurs when a manager needs currency to buy or sell an
underlying asset such as a stock or a bond. With this formula, long positions are
signed positively, and short positions are signed negatively. The marked-to-market
gain or loss for a day is calculated similarly as
PNLk,t =
S∑
s=0
hsk,t−1
(
f sk,t
f s+1k,t−1
− 1
)
.
With holdings in hand, it is a simple matter to calculate risk exposure. Let
hit be a vector of currency holdings for fund i on date t. Risk is measured as
the standard quadratic form h′it hit, where is the covariance matrix of annu-
alized currency returns. We calculate as the uncentered second moment of our
panel of daily currency returns beginning on January 1, 1994, where the returns
are exponentially weighted using a decay factor of 0.998, implying a half-life of
about 350 trading days. Note that the relevant matrix differs according to the
base currency of each fund. For example, a euro position held by a dollar-based
fund entails much more risk than the same position held by a Scandinavian fund,
relative to base currency. To cater to this, we calculate separate covariance ma-
trices k for each base currency k and then compute the relevant quadratic form
h′it khit for each fund. Since h is always calculated in dollars, risk for all funds
is also expressed in dollars, regardless of base currency.
To ensure quality of the data series, the analysis is confined to the larger
funds in the universe, as these tend to have more frequent trading. Moreover, only
trades in the 10 major currencies4 are included. Mindful of survivorship bias, the
requirement for inclusion in our sample is that a fund be in the 95th percentile
of trading volume in at least one of six evenly-sampled weeks over the sample
period. The six weeks are weeks 1, 101, 201, 301, 401, and 470 in our 470-week
sample. This criterion selected a subset of 512 funds that account for an average of
72% of the volume across the 10 currencies. Our analysis focuses on the behavior
of these 512 funds, which have average absolute daily holdings of about $145
million.5 Figure 1 plots the absolute holdings by currency aggregated across the
512 funds. It indicates that most of the fund holdings are concentrated in the euro,
Japanese yen, British pound, Australian dollar, and Canadian dollar.
The database also includes comprehensive information on the total holdings
of each fund by asset class for 2001. Based on this, funds can be classified as fixed
4The 10 currencies are the Danish krone, Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, Swiss franc, British
pound, Australian dollar, Japanese yen, New Zealand dollar, Canadian dollar, and euro. Prior to 1999,
synthetic euro return and flow series are constructed by weighting across the euro member countries.
5Nonetheless, we also redo the basic tests on the aggregate risk and P&L series of the remain-
ing funds and obtain similar results. These results are omitted for brevity and are available from the
authors.
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160 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
FIGURE 1
Absolute Value of Holdings by Currency Aggregated Across All Funds
The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. JPY denotes Japanese yen, CAD denotes the Canadian
dollar, AUD denotes the Australian dollar, NZD denotes the New Zealand dollar, EUR denotes the euro, GBP denotes the
British pound, CHF denotes the Swiss franc, DKK denotes the Danish krone, NOK denotes the Norwegian krone, and SEK
denotes the Swedish krona. Absolute holding is measured in billions of U.S. dollars.
income, equity, or currency funds. Funds with fixed income holdings in excess of
equity holdings are defined as fixed income funds, and vice versa. Currency funds
have no equity or fixed income positions. The resulting categorization comprises
158 fixed income funds, 71 equity funds, and 149 currency funds.
An important question to address is the potential influence of currency hedg-
ing in our data.6 Currency trades can arise from passive or active currency man-
agement. Passive currency management, also known as currency overlay, arises
from the desire to hedge preexisting currency exposure, such as that inherited
from underlying holdings of equity or fixed income securities. Active currency
management involves taking positions in currencies with a view to earning abso-
lute return from exchange rate movements.7 Since holdings commingle passive
and active trades, and passive exposures are partly driven by exogenous factors,
it may be difficult to measure the influence of past currency gains and losses
on currency risk-taking. Essentially, the question boils down to whether there is
an omitted variable bias stemming from the omission of the determinants of the
passive holdings. The answer will depend on whether the omitted determinants—
in particular, the returns on underlying equity and fixed income securities—are
correlated with currency returns. It turns out that, for the countries we are inter-
ested in, the correlation between underlying asset returns and currency returns is
quite low. For example, the average correlation between weekly currency returns
6We thank Joel Hasbrouck for pointing this out.
7The Appendix provides further details on spot and forward currency transactions.
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O’Connell and Teo 161
and local currency equity returns across countries is −0.07. The corresponding
number for sovereign fixed income securities is 0.09. This suggests that the omit-
ted variable bias, if present, will be relatively muted. For added comfort, in the
rest of the analysis, we present separate results for the sample of pure currency
funds, which will contain a relatively higher fraction of purely active exposures. In
addition, since hedging requires the taking of short positions in foreign currency
relative to base currency, we will examine the results for long-only positions of
foreign currency, which by definition will be unrelated to hedging.
III. Empirical Results
A. Basic Results
The first order of business is to determine the basic relationship between per-
formance and risk-taking. We are interested in the sign and economic magnitude
of the relationship and also in how, if at all, it varies across currencies and funds.
The tool we use is an unrestricted VAR, which is first estimated at the weekly fre-
quency to control for potential day-of-the week effects. We estimate panel VARs
for changes in risk and P&L at the aggregate level, currency level, fund level,
and fully disaggregated level. The model allows for heteroskedasticity across cur-
rencies and funds. The lag length L is set at 13 weeks, the value selected by the
Bayes-Schwartz Criterion for the fund panel regression.
The aggregate level VAR can be written as:
(1) yt =α +
L∑
LAG=1
ΦLAGyt−LAG + εt,
where yt = [ΔRISKtPNLt]′ captures the changes in aggregate risk and profit at
time t and εt = [εΔRISKt εPNLt ]′ is distributed as N(0,Ω). At the currency level, we
estimate a panel version of equation (1) with yk,t = [ΔRISKk,tPNLk,t]′ denoting
changes in risk and profit at time t for currency k, and the coefficient matrices
constrained to be equal across currencies. At the fund level, we estimate a panel
version of equation (1) with yi,t=[ΔRISKi,tPNLi,t]′ denoting changes in risk and
profit at time t for fund i, and the coefficient matrices constrained to be equal
across funds. We also estimate a fully-disaggregated currency-fund version of
equation (1) with yi,k,t = [ΔRISKi,k,tPNLi,k,t]′, and the coefficient matrices con-
strained to be equal across currencies and funds.
Figure 2 plots the impulse response functions from the VAR. They trace out
the effects of past performance on risk-taking and vice versa. The leftmost column
shows the impact that a one-standard-deviation shock to P&L has on weekly risk,
while the rightmost column shows the impact that a one-standard-deviation shock
to risk has on weekly P&L. The effects measured on the vertical axes are also
scaled in standard deviation units, and 90% confidence intervals based on maxi-
mum likelihood standard errors are sketched around each function. To calibrate,
the one-standard-deviation P&L shocks at each level of aggregation are $163m,
$43m, $3.4m, and $1.1m, while the shocks to annualized risk are $69m, $23m,
$3.2m, and $1.6m. The own-equation effects are omitted for brevity.
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162 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
FIGURE 2
Impulse Response Functions for Shocks to Risk and P&L with Weekly Lags
The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. The sample includes the 10 major currencies and 512 funds.
The aggregated-by-fund and currency panel consists of a series of length W weeks, the number of weeks in the sample
period. The aggregated-by-currency panel consists of 10 currency-by-currency series of length W. The aggregated-
by-fund panel consists of 512 fund-by-fund series of various lengths depending on fund life. The fully disaggregated
panel consists of 2,455 fund-by-fund, currency-by-currency series (since not every fund trades every currency) of various
lengths. To generate the Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response functions, panel VARs for risk and P&L are estimated
with a lag length of 13 weeks, the value selected by the Bayes-Schwartz Information Criterion for the fund panel regression.
The VARs allow for heteroskedasticity across currencies and funds. The vertical axes are scaled in standard deviation units
of risk and P&L. The dotted lines sketched around each function are 90% conﬁdence interval bounds based on maximum
likelihood standard errors.
The leftmost column of impulse response functions in Figure 2 indicates that
institutional investors increase risk following good performance. At all levels of
aggregation, past performance exerts a positive and statistically significant impact
on risk-taking, and the impact persists for six to eight weeks. For the fund panel
regression, a one-standard-deviation shock to P&L produces a 3% standard devi-
ation change in risk-taking after four weeks. The economic impact is significant.
In dollar terms, a one-standard-deviation shock to P&L for a fund is $3.4m, and
this elicits an increase in annualized risk of $96,000 over the next four weeks, or
an incremental holding of $960,000.8 Turning to the rightmost column of plots,
there is some indication that the level of profits improves with risk-taking, though
not significantly so. Only with the fully disaggregated panel do we find that
risk-taking has a positively significant effect on profits.
Having shown that the results are robust to potential day-of-the week
effects, we now focus on the daily horizon to obtain a clearer picture of the
high-frequency impact of past P&L on risk-taking.9 Toward this end, we generate
8With annualized volatility of approximately 10%, an increase of $96,000 in risk equates to an
increased holding of $960,000.
9The rest of the analysis will be conducted at the daily frequency, unless noted otherwise, although
our results also hold at the weekly frequency.
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O’Connell and Teo 163
impulse response functions from the VAR with daily lags, where the lag length
L is set at 20 days. The impulse response functions with daily lags displayed in
Figure 3 broadly agree with those in Figure 2. They indicate that at all levels of
aggregation, a shock to daily P&L increases daily risk-taking. This effect grows
over the next 15 days before peaking at around the 15–20 day horizon (i.e., at
around the fourth week).
FIGURE 3
Impulse Response Functions for Shocks to Risk and P&L with Daily Lags
Thesampleperiod is fromJanuary 1995 toDecember 2002. The sample includes the10major currencies and512 funds. The
aggregated-by-fund and currency panel consists of a series of length T days, the number of days in the sample period.
The aggregated-by-currency panel consists of 10 currency-by-currency series of length T. The aggregated-by-fund panel
consists of 512 fund-by-fund series of various lengths depending on fund life. The fully disaggregated panel consists of
fund-by-fund, currency-by-currency series of various lengths. To generate the Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response
functions, panel VARs for risk and P&L are estimated with a lag length of 20 days. The VARs allow for heteroskedasticity
across currencies and funds. The vertical axes are scaled in standard deviation units of risk and P&L. The dotted lines
sketched around each function are 90% conﬁdence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
To check the pervasiveness of the performance dependence, we estimate the
fully disaggregated VAR for each currency. Panel A of Table 1 shows the coef-
ficient estimates on the first eight daily lags of P&L for the risk equation. The
performance dependence observed in Figure 3 characterizes eight of the 10 cur-
rencies, the exceptions being the New Zealand dollar and the Canadian dollar.
Since the trading volume in these currencies is 1.12% and 6.98% of the total vol-
ume, respectively, the performance dependence applies to the bulk of currency
trading in our sample. Specifically, there is evidence of statistically positive P&L
lag coefficients (lagged one, two, and three days) at the 10% level for 90.94%
of the trading volume (Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, Swiss franc, British
pound, Australian dollar, Japanese yen, and euro). Also, we compute F-statistics
to test the hypothesis that P&L does not Granger cause risk-taking. We are able to
reject the hypothesis at the 5% level for all four major currencies (British pound,
Australian dollar, Japanese yen, and euro), which account for 78.71% of the
trading volume.
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TABLE 1
Regressions on Daily Change in Fund Risk
Table 1 reports maximum likelihood regression coefﬁcients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for 10 regressions, each regression corresponding to a currency, along with the associated F-statistics. The dependent
variable is the daily change in risk. The independent variables are the past 20 daily lags of change in risk and the past 20 daily lags of P&L. Only the coefﬁcients and t-statistics for the ﬁrst eight daily P&L lags are
reported for brevity. Coefﬁcients are multiplied by 100. The F-statistics test the hypothesis that the coefﬁcients on the P&L lags are all equal to zero. Panels A and B list regression coefﬁcients and t-statistics for
regressions for the full fund sample and the pure currency fund sample, respectively. Coefﬁcients in bold denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level. ** and * indicate F-statistic signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5%
levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Daily Change in Fund Risk
Independent Danish Norwegian Swedish Swiss British Australian Japanese New Zealand Canadian
Variables Kroner Krone Krona Franc Pound Dollar Yen Dollar Dollar Euro
Panel A. All Funds
P&L (T− 1) 0.082 1.875 0.514 0.636 0.590 0.431 0.392 −1.14 −0.833 0.810
(1.10) (4.87) (2.45) (2.80) (2.89) (1.79) (1.91) (−4.23) (−3.08) (5.33)
P&L (T− 2) 0.010 0.144 0.495 −0.041 0.671 0.745 0.248 −0.720 0.410 0.660
(0.13) (0.37) (2.36) (−0.18) (3.29) (3.10) (1.21) (−2.67) (1.52) (4.30)
P&L (T− 3) −0.055 −0.442 −0.213 −0.261 0.793 0.019 0.253 −0.113 0.335 0.347
(−0.74) (−1.15) (−1.02) (−1.15) (3.88) (0.08) (1.23) (−0.42) (1.24) (2.24)
P&L (T− 4) −0.035 1.706 −0.150 0.496 0.127 0.563 0.385 0.328 0.783 0.238
(−0.47) (4.43) (−0.72) (2.18) (0.62) (2.34) (1.87) (1.21) (2.87) (1.54)
P&L (T− 5) 0.056 −0.910 0.403 0.500 0.084 −0.058 0.097 −0.576 0.041 0.735
(0.75) (−2.36) (1.93) (2.20) (0.41) (−0.24) (0.47) (−2.14) (0.15) (4.85)
P&L (T− 6) 0.059 −0.091 −0.029 −0.095 0.249 0.857 0.154 0.386 0.478 0.097
(0.80) (−0.24) (−0.14) (−0.42) (1.22) (3.56) (0.75) (1.43) (1.76) (0.64)
P&L (T− 7) 0.112 0.641 −0.219 0.413 0.582 −0.011 0.385 −0.163 0.350 0.105
(1.52) (1.67) (−1.05) (1.82) (2.85) (−0.04) (1.88) (−0.60) (1.29) (0.71)
P&L (T− 8) 0.015 0.537 −0.008 0.496 −0.066 0.101 0.079 0.363 −0.089 −0.111
(0.20) (1.40) (−0.04) (2.18) (−0.32) (0.42) (0.39) (1.34) (−0.33) (−0.76)
F-statistic 1.05 3.45** 2.05** 2.70** 5.19** 2.47** 1.65* 3.59** 1.96** 4.59**
% of volume 0.96 0.59 2.63 9.02 14.50 5.68 22.52 1.12 6.98 36.00
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
Regressions on Daily Change in Fund Risk
Dependent Variable: Daily Change in Fund Risk
Independent Danish Norwegian Swedish Swiss British Australian Japanese New Zealand Canadian
Variables Kroner Krone Krona Franc Pound Dollar Yen Dollar Dollar Euro
Panel B. Pure Currency Funds
P&L (T− 1) 0.426 1.929 3.532 3.480 2.023 0.548 0.479 −1.481 −0.782 1.785
(1.72) (3.24) (7.58) (6.92) (5.33) (1.38) (1.40) (−3.59) (−1.75) (6.78)
P&L (T− 2) 0.006 1.154 1.191 0.160 1.194 0.727 0.622 −0.717 0.499 1.025
(0.02) (1.94) (2.55) (0.32) (3.15) (1.84) (1.82) (−1.74) (1.12) (3.82)
P&L (T− 3) 0.124 0.242 0.155 −0.642 0.775 0.646 −0.027 0.216 0.788 0.059
(0.50) (0.41) (0.33) (−1.28) (2.04) (1.64) (−0.08) (0.52) (1.76) (0.23)
P&L (T− 4) −0.005 0.742 1.019 1.153 0.845 0.630 0.804 0.514 0.708 0.493
(−0.02) (1.25) (2.18) (2.30) (2.23) (1.59) (2.36) (1.24) (1.57) (1.87)
P&L (T− 5) 0.106 0.869 0.465 1.412 0.465 −0.141 −0.295 −0.343 0.520 1.017
(0.43) (1.46) (1.00) (2.81) (1.22) (−0.36) (−0.86) (−0.83) (1.16) (3.89)
P&L (T− 6) 0.042 0.015 −0.349 −1.272 −0.359 0.329 0.574 0.795 −0.148 −0.147
(0.17) (0.02) (−0.75) (−2.54) (−0.95) (0.83) (1.68) (1.92) (−0.33) (−0.56)
P&L (T− 7) 0.225 1.435 −0.032 0.301 0.929 −0.357 0.026 −0.071 −0.633 0.833
(0.91) (2.41) (−0.07) (0.60) (2.45) (−0.90) (0.08) (−0.17) (−1.41) (3.21)
P&L (T− 8) 0.422 0.783 −0.203 0.829 0.370 −0.500 0.021 0.009 −0.316 −0.379
(1.71) (1.31) (−0.43) (1.66) (0.98) (−1.27) (0.06) (0.02) (−0.70) (−1.42)
F-statistic 0.57 2.51** 4.09** 5.39** 4.59** 1.47 2.53** 3.48** 1.83* 6.30**
% of volume 0.96 0.59 2.63 9.02 14.50 5.68 22.52 1.12 6.98 36.00
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As already mentioned, passive currency hedging is unlikely to bias the
results, given the low correlation between currency returns and the returns on un-
derlying assets. Nonetheless, it is useful to analyze data from the sample of pure
currency funds, since it is likely to have a higher concentration of purely active
trading. Panel B of Table 1 reports the coefficient estimates from the currency-
by-currency regressions for the pure currency funds sample. The first lag of P&L
is positive for eight of the 10 currencies, and there are statistically positive early
P&L lags at the 10% level for all four top-volume currencies (Swiss franc, British
pound, Japanese yen, and euro). Clearly, the performance dependence is pervasive
for the currency funds sample as well.
To complement the pure currency funds analysis, we also estimate the fund
level VAR of equation (1) for equity and bond types. The impulse responses of
risk to shocks in P&L for each fund type are displayed in Figure 4. Currency
and bond funds display qualitatively the same sensitivity to past P&L as with
the full group of funds. Equity funds, in contrast, display a negative but somewhat
random response to past performance that is statistically insignificant for the most
part. This accords with the folk wisdom that equity fund managers care less about
the currency component of their returns. To be fair, the statistical power of the
equity sample is much lower, since the number of equity funds, at 71, is about
half the number of currency or bond funds in the sample.
B. Conditioning on Past Gains and Losses
An important question is whether the impact of gains and losses is sym-
metric. To investigate this, we estimate the following daily fund level regres-
sion with P&L interacted with the positive P&L dummy and the negative P&L
dummy:10
ΔRISKi,t= a +
L∑
LAG=1
bLAGΔRISKi,t−LAG(2)
+
L∑
LAG=1
cLAGPOSPNLi,t−LAG
+
L∑
LAG=1
dLAGNEGPNLi,t−LAG + εi,t,
where i=1, . . . ,NFUND, t=1, . . . ,T, L=20 days, and POSPNL=max(PNL, 0)
and NEGPNL=min(PNL, 0). The rest of the variables are as defined earlier.
Figure 5 plots separate impulse response functions for gains and losses, es-
timated from the fund panel. This is done for the full sample of funds (leftmost
plots) and the pure currency funds sample (rightmost plots). There is, in fact, a
striking difference in the two impulse response functions. Over the full sample of
10Since our focus will be on the risk equation in the VAR, we adopt the single equation regression
approach for the rest of the paper.
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FIGURE 4
Impulse Response of Risk to Shocks in P&L Broken Down by Fund Type
(impact on fx risk of 1 σ fx P&L shock)
The Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response functions are generated from a 20-day-lag bivariate panel VAR for risk and
P&L. The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. The model allows for heteroskedasticity across funds.
Estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood, stacking all of the funds in the sample. The vertical axes are scaled
in standard deviation units of risk. The dotted lines sketched around each function are 90% conﬁdence interval bounds
based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
funds, gains produce transitory increases in risk-taking that taper off after about
20 days. In contrast, the effects of losses are both stronger and more durable. Note
that the impulse response function located second from the bottom and in the left-
most panel of Figure 3 is simply the average of these two functions. The impli-
cation is that the performance dependence illustrated in Figure 3 masks separate
effects of gains that appear to be weaker and less durable, and losses that appear
to be stronger and more durable. The same dichotomous pattern of performance
dependence is evident in the pure currency funds sample.
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FIGURE 5
Fund Panel Impulse Response Functions for Gains and Losses
The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. To generate the Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response
functions, risk is regressed on daily lags of P&L conditional on gains and daily lags of P&L conditional on losses for the
fund panel. The regression allows for heteroskedasticity across funds and uses the same lag structure as the VARs in
Figure 3. The vertical axes are scaled in standard deviation units of risk. The dotted lines sketched around each function
are 90% conﬁdence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
The fund level regressions thus far allow for group-wise heteroskedasticity
across funds. However, because funds may be trading on the same information, we
may need to adjust for cross-sectional covariance across funds. This adjustment
requires a balanced panel and forces us to analyze only funds that survive the
entire sample period, reducing the sample to just 35 funds. Nonetheless, our basic
and conditional results for the fund panel (with cross-sectional covariance across
groups) still hold with this small sample of funds.
IV. Discussion
Next, we explore various explanations for the documented performance
dependence. The explanations include a mechanical relationship between risk-
taking and performance, hedging activities, capital constraints, stop-loss rules,
momentum trading, managerial compensation and reputation concerns, the dis-
position effect, dynamic loss aversion, and overconfidence.
A. Mechanical Relationship between Risk-Taking and Performance
There are concerns that risk-taking may be hardwired to performance. For
example, suppose a fund manager holds αt of her portfolio in the S&P 500 index
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109009090048
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and 1−αt in T-bills at the end of period t, where 0 < αt < 1. We notice that after
positive outcomes (up market periods), the manager appears to “increase” the risk
of her portfolio (the beta of her portfolio increases). After negative outcomes, the
manager appears to “decrease” the risk of her portfolio.
However, such a mechanical relationship cannot account for our results for
three reasons. First, the mechanical relationship is a contemporaneous one. Con-
sider a U.S.-based fund that is long the euro. If the price of the euro rises from end
of day t−1 to end of day t, the fund registers a gain in day t and risk rises from the
end of day t−1 to the end of day t. Since we ask whether P&L today explains the
change in risk between today and tomorrow, our results are noncontemporaneous.
Second, if there is significant positive serial correlation in P&L at the one-day
horizon, the mechanical relationship might carry over to the noncontemporane-
ous setting, but there is no evidence of such daily serial correlation in the data.
Third, the mechanical relationship is reversed when a fund is short a currency. To
see this, suppose the fund was short USD 1m of euros and the euro depreciates
20% relative to the dollar, so that the fund is now short USD 0.8m of euros. The
fund registers a gain, and risk-taking falls at the same time. Since we broadly have
as many longs as shorts in our database (there are 227,178 long fund-day obser-
vations and 294,361 short fund-day observations), the contemporaneous mechan-
ical effect can go either way. To test the direction of the contemporaneous effect,
we estimate the base regression for the fund panel augmented with an additional
independent variable: contemporaneous daily P&L. We find that the coefficient on
contemporaneous P&L is statistically negative. More importantly, the coefficient
estimates on the first few P&L lags are still positive and statistically significant.
This is true whether we focus on the full sample or on the pure currency funds
sample.
B. Overlay and Hedging
Returning to the issue of whether passive hedging is influencing the re-
sults, we replicate the analysis on the subsample of fund-currency observations
associated with long currency positions. The basic premise is that overlay strate-
gies typically involve managers being long a foreign investment (e.g., Japanese
government bonds) and short the foreign currency (e.g., the yen) relative to
base currency. Hence, long currency positions are unlikely to stem from overlay
activities. The currency-fund panel impulse response functions for the analysis on
long currency positions in Figure 6 suggest that our results are not driven by over-
lay activities. As with Figure 3, an increase in P&L still exerts a reliably positive
effect on future risk-taking. Also, for long currency positions, the effects of a gain
are weaker than those of a loss, as suggested by the middle and bottom impulse
response functions of Figure 6.
C. Margin and Capital Constraints
Another possible explanation for the observed performance dependence is
that margin or capital constraints come into play. When institutions are faced with
large losses, they may be forced by binding capital constraints to clamp down
on risk-taking. This could explain the strong and durable reaction to losses we
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109009090048
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FIGURE 6
Fund Panel Impulse Response Functions for Long Currency Positions
The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. To generate the Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response
functions in Graph A, risk is regressed on daily lags of P&L for the fully disaggregated currency-fund panel. In Graphs
B and C, risk is regressed on daily lags of P&L conditional on gains and daily lags of P&L conditional on losses for
the currency-fund panel. The regression allows for heteroskedasticity across currencies and funds and uses the same lag
structure as the VARs in Figure 3. The vertical axes are scaled in standard deviation units of risk. The dotted lines sketched
around each function are 90% conﬁdence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
witness in Figure 5. However, when capital or margin limits are in place, cross-
currency effects on risk are apt to arise. Because such limits operate at the fund
level and not just at the account level, for each currency and each fund, past gains
and losses on one currency should also affect risk-taking in other currencies in the
fund.11 To test this, we augment the independent variables in the risk equation of
equation (1) with past 20 lags of daily P&L from the other currencies (which we
term conjugate currency P&L):
11The recent demise of the U.S. hedge fund Amaranth Advisors LLC, where the losses on its natural
gas positions affected risk-taking in its other positions, is an extreme example of capital constraints
at work. See “End of the Road for Dollars 6bn-Loser Amaranth,” Financial Times (September 27,
2006).
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ΔRISKi,k,t = ak +
L∑
LAG=1
bkLAGΔRISKi,k,t−LAG(3)
+
L∑
LAG=1
ckLAGPNLi,k,t−LAG
+
L∑
LAG=1
dkLAGCONJPNLi,k,t−LAG + εi,k,t,
where CONJPNLi,k,t=
∑
j=k PNLi, j,t, i=1, . . . ,NFUND, k=1, . . . ,NCURR,
t = 1, . . . , T, L = 20 days. Then, we estimate the equation (3) regressions with
daily lags. In results available upon request, we find that cross-currency effects are
noticeably absent and do not drive the performance dependence. This also lends
support to the idea that institutional managers narrowly frame their decisions at
the account level and not at the fund level. Narrow framing is, in turn, consis-
tent with preferences like those proposed by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001),
where an agent’s decision utility must depend on the outcome of the gamble over
and above what that outcome implies for total wealth risk.12
D. Stop-Loss Activities
A related view is that institutional investors follow risk-management-
motivated stop-loss rules that require them to cut exposure in the wake of a
significant loss (Osler (2003)). For example, a fund might close out a position if
it suffers more than a 20% loss on the position. Stop-loss trading may therefore
explain the strong negative reaction of risk to losses. For stop-loss rules to drive
our results, it must be that the reaction to losses is dictated by the most extreme
losses. There should exist a large loss cutoff such that there is no risk reaction
for all losses smaller in magnitude than the cutoff. To test this, we estimate the
following regression for various loss cutoffs and for each currency with daily lags:
ΔRISKi,k,t = ak +
L∑
LAG=1
bkLAGΔRISKi,k,t−LAG(4)
+
L∑
LAG=1
ckLAGPOSPNLi,k,t−LAG
+
L∑
LAG=1
dkLAGSNEGPNLi,k,t−LAG
+
L∑
LAG=1
ekLAGLNEGPNLi,k,t−LAG + εi,k,t,
12See Section 4.2 of Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) for further discussion.
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where i= 1, . . . ,NFUND, k= 1, . . . ,NCURR, t= 1, . . . , T, L= 20 days, and
SNEGPNL equals NEGPNL for losses smaller in magnitude than the cutoff and
equals zero otherwise, while LNEGPNL equals NEGPNL for losses larger in
magnitude than the cutoff and equals zero otherwise. The regressions are esti-
mated at the fully disaggregated level, as it is harder to detect stop-loss trading,
if any, in aggregated data. We use a wide range of loss cutoffs including the 50th,
60th, 70th, 80th, 90th, and 95th loss percentiles to detect stop-loss behavior. De-
spite the extensive battery of tests, for all currencies, we cannot find a loss cutoff
such that the coefficient on SNEGPNL is statistically insignificant and the coeffi-
cient on LNEGPNL is statistically significant. In fact, for all currencies where the
positive risk/past performance relationship holds (see Table 1), the coefficient on
SNEGPNL is significant for all cutoff levels. Hence, stop-loss rules are unlikely
to drive the reaction to losses that we observe.
E. Correlated Profit Opportunities
Prior studies have found that institutions engage in momentum trading and
buy into well-performing stocks (Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003), Badri-
nath and Wahal (2002)). It is easy to see why momentum trading may induce
the observed reaction to past performance. Suppose an institution that follows
momentum strategies is long a currency. If the subsequent returns are high, the
institution racks up gains and increases its long exposure in line with its momen-
tum strategy. Conversely, when subsequent returns are low, the institution suffers
losses and reduces its long exposure to the currency in line with the momentum
strategy. A similar relationship exists when a momentum trader is short a cur-
rency. However, momentum does not explain the asymmetry between the risk
reaction to gains and losses. For momentum to account for the asymmetry we ob-
serve, it must be that funds adopt momentum strategies more often when they face
losses than when they face gains. It is difficult to understand why the impetus for
momentum trading would vary systematically with the sign of past performance.
Nonetheless, to test whether our findings are driven by momentum, we estimate
the following currency-by-currency, fund panel regression with daily lags:
ΔRISKi,k,t = ak +
L∑
LAG=1
bkLAGΔRISKi,k,t−LAG(5)
+
L∑
LAG=1
ckLAGPNLi,k,t−LAG
+
L∑
LAG=1
dkLAGRETk,t−LAGSIGN(HOLDi,k,t−LAG) + εi,k,t,
where i = 1, . . . ,NFUND, k = 1, . . . ,NCURR, t = 1, . . . , T, L = 20 days,
and RET is currency return, HOLD is currency holdings, and SIGN(X) is the
sign of variable X. The results indicate that momentum trading does not drive
the observed reaction of risk to past performance. Most of the signed return lags
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are insignificantly different from zero, while the coefficients on the P&L lags are
qualitatively similar to those in Table 1.
F. Manager’s Compensation and Reputation Concerns
Institutional reputation concerns may induce performance dependence. To
minimize the impact of negative investment outcomes on their reputation, institu-
tions tend to follow each other’s trades or herd (Wermers (1999), Sias (2004)). To
explore the effects of herding in our sample of institutional investors, we augment
the regressors in the currency-by-currency, fund panel regressions with the frac-
tion of institutions increasing exposure to the currency minus the average fraction
of institutions increasing exposure to currencies. This variable is the risk analog
of the herding ratio in equation (2) of Sias (2004). The results from this exercise
suggest that herding is tangential to the risk/past performance relationship. None
of the coefficients on the herding variable lags are statistically significant.
Managerial compensation concerns may also generate performance depen-
dence. Because manager compensation is often viewed as a convex function of
performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Del Guercio and Tkac (2008)), funds
tend to cut risk following bouts of good performance and increase risk following
bouts of poor performance (Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Elton, Gruber, and
Blake (2003)). However, such compensation effects cannot explain our results,
as they predict the exact opposite of what we find in Figure 5. Moreover, such
incentive effects should operate at the portfolio level and not just at the currency
level. Yet, we fail to detect cross-currency effects within funds. This suggests that
managerial concerns do not drive the short-term performance dependence that we
uncover.
G. Disposition Effect
A large body of work finds that individuals, including retail and professional
investors, are prone to the disposition effect (Odean (1998), Linnainmaa (2003),
Locke and Mann (2005), and Coval and Shumway (2005)). In addition, Grinblatt
and Keloharju (2001) show that local institutional investors in the Finnish market
are also afflicted by the disposition effect. If the investors in our sample are simi-
larly affected, then they should not reduce risk following losses (by holding onto
their losses) and should reduce risk following gains (by selling their winners).
Yet, we find that they cut risk following losses and ramp up risk following gains.
Our results challenge Grinblatt and Keloharju’s (2001) findings and suggest that
disposition results in the literature are sensitive to investor type.
To better square our surprising disposition results with the extant literature,
and to facilitate comparison, we adopt the methodology of Odean (1998) and
compare the proportion of losses realized (PLR) with the proportion of gains real-
ized (PGR). The analysis relies on daily aggregated buys and sells. One advantage
of aggregation is that we control for investors who break up their trades over the
course of a day. We assume that currencies are bought and sold at closing prices.
Following Odean (1998), each day that an offsetting daily flow occurs, we com-
pare the price of that currency to its average purchase price to determine whether
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that currency is sold or bought for a gain or a loss. An offsetting flow occurs when
the fund is net long the currency and sells the currency, or when the fund is net
short the currency and buys the currency. Each currency that is held by the fund
for that day but does not experience an offsetting flow is considered to be a paper
(unrealized) gain or loss (or neither). On days when no offsetting flows take place
for a fund, no gains and losses, realized or paper, are recorded.
First, we aggregate the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses,
and paper losses over time and across funds. The PGR is the ratio of the aggre-
gated realized gains over the aggregated realized and paper gains. The PLR is
the ratio of the aggregated realized losses over the aggregated realized and paper
losses. The hypothesis is that there is no disposition effect or PLR≥ PGR. Hence,
the null hypothesis is PLR < PGR. The results of this test are presented in Panel
A of Table 2. Over the full sample, we find that PLR is 0.2333, while PGR is
0.2304. The difference in proportions (PLR minus PGR) is positive and statisti-
cally significant13 at the 1% level. This starkly contrasts with Odean (1998), who
finds that the difference in proportions for his sample of retail investors is statisti-
cally negative. Unlike his retail investors, the institutional investors in our sample
do not seem prone to the disposition effect. The analysis here nicely corroborates
our findings with the VAR. Mindful once again of the potential influence of pas-
sive hedging, we also replicate the analysis for pure currency funds and find even
stronger results. The difference in proportions for the pure currency funds sample
is about 2.8 times that for the full sample of funds.
The aggregate analysis counts each realized gain, realized loss, paper gain,
and paper loss on the day of an offsetting flow as separate independent observa-
tions. This assumption may not hold. Daily flows may be correlated across time
within each fund if funds are offloading large positions over several days or may
be correlated across funds if funds are trading on the same information. In Panel
B of Table 2, we relax the assumption that flows are independent across time for
each fund and calculate the average fund PLR and PGR. Only funds with non-
zero denominators for both PLR and PGR are included in the analysis, giving
us a sample of 498 funds and 144 pure currency funds. We find that inferences
remain unchanged with the fund-level PLR and PGR comparison. In Panel C of
Table 2, in addition to relaxing the assumption of independence across time, we
also try to control for dependence across funds. Daily flows in a currency are
counted only if no more than two other funds have flows of the same sign for the
same currency that day. Thus, we ensure that daily flows in the same direction for
more than three funds are not counted. This control for correlated fund flow gives
us a sample of 292 funds and 74 pure currency funds with non-zero denominators
13The standard error used to calculate the t-statistics in the aggregate analysis is
√
PGR(1− PGR)
nRG + nPG
+
PLR(1− PLR)
nRL + nPL
,
where nRG, nPG, nRL, and nPL are the number of realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and
paper losses, respectively.
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TABLE 2
Proportion of Gains and Losses Realized
Table 2 compares the proportion of gains realized (PGR) to the proportion of losses realized (PLR), where PGR is the
number of realized gains divided by the number of realized gains plus the number of paper (unrealized) gains, and PLR
is the number of realized losses divided by the number of realized losses plus the number of paper (unrealized) losses.
Buys and sells are aggregated each day for this analysis. In Panel A, realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and
paper losses are aggregated over time (1995–2002) and across all funds or across all pure currency funds in the sample.
For the full sample of funds, there are 217,583 realized gains, 726,949 paper gains, 201,798 realized losses, and 663,035
paper losses. For the pure currency sample of funds, there are 68,029 realized gains, 193,252 paper gains, 64,066 realized
losses, and 174,234 paper losses. The t-statistics test the null hypothesis that the differences in proportions are equal to
zero assuming that all realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses result from independent decisions.
In Panel B, realized gains, paper gains, realized losses, and paper losses are aggregated over time (1995–2002) for each
fund. The average PLR and PGR are reported as well as the average difference in proportions across all funds or across
all pure currency funds. The t-statistics test the null hypothesis that the differences between fund level PGR and PLR is
equal to zero assuming independence of gains and losses at the fund level. In Panel C, the analysis is similar to that in
Panel B except that the daily ﬂows in a currency are counted only if no more than two other funds have ﬂows of the same
sign for the same currency on that day. This controls for the dependence in PGR and PLR across funds. ** and * indicate
signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
All Funds Pure Currency Funds
Panel A. Aggregate Level
PLR 0.2333 0.2688
PGR 0.2304 0.2604
Difference in proportions (PLR− PGR) 0.0029** 0.0084**
t-statistic 4.74 6.78
Panel B. Fund Level
Average PLR across funds 0.3337 0.4417
Average PGR across funds 0.3274 0.4316
Average difference in proportions 0.0063** 0.0101**
t-statistic 3.12 2.80
Panel C. Fund Level (controlling for dependence in PGR and PLR across funds)
Average PLR across funds 0.2528 0.3018
Average PGR across funds 0.2313 0.2490
Average difference in proportions 0.0215* 0.0528*
t-statistic 2.03 2.45
for PGR and PLR. For this sample of funds, we find that PLR is again statistically
higher than PGR.14
Since Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find evidence of the disposition effect
with their sample of institutional investors, it will be important to reconcile our
results with theirs. To this end, we replicate their logit regression methodology on
our sample of institutional investors. To investigate the determinants of the sell-
versus-hold decision, we regress a sell-versus-hold dummy variable (that takes a
value of one when an investor sells a currency and a value of zero otherwise) on
lags of currency returns, a large loss dummy, and a small loss dummy.15 The vari-
ables are signed appropriately so that all inferences can be made as if investors are
long currencies. As in Table I of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), currency returns
14The standard error for the average difference in the fund-level PLR and PGR is
1
K
√√√√ K∑
i=1
[
PGRi(1− PGRi)
NRGi + NPGi
+
PLRi(1− PLRi)
NRLi + NPLi
]
,
where NRGi, NPGi, NRLi, and NPLi, are the account level number of realized gains, paper gains,
realized losses, and paper losses, respectively.
15We define a large loss as a loss larger in magnitude than the median loss and a small loss as a loss
smaller in magnitude than the median loss.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109009090048
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core . Singapore M
anagem
ent U
niversity (SM
U
) , on 11 A
ug 2017 at 06:46:57 , subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available at https://w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s .
176 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
for day 0, −1, −2, −3, −4, [−19,−5], [−39,−20], [−59,−40], [−119,−60],
[−179,−120], and [−239,−180] are included among the regressors as controls.
The coefficient estimates on the small and large loss dummies for the full sam-
ple are displayed in Panel A of Table 3. They suggest that for nine out of the
10 currencies, a loss increases the probability that an institutional investor will
sell versus hold a currency. This sharply contrasts with Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001), who find that a loss induces the institutional investors in their sample to
hold rather than to sell (i.e., the coefficient estimates on their loss dummies are
statistically negative). Our results cannot be explained by the effects of overlay
or hedging, as they persist with the pure currency funds sample (see Panel B,
Table 3). Further, we redo the analysis on the sell-versus-buy decision and find
similar results (see Panels C and D, Table 3). The logit regression results indi-
cate that the difference between our findings and those of Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001) on the disposition effect cannot be traced to methodology. Rather, we argue
that by focusing on the currency trades that better capture the active component
of institutional investor trading, we obtain very different results on the disposi-
tion effect. The institutional investors in our sample appear sophisticated enough
to avoid one of the most common trading pitfalls facing individual investors—
the disposition effect. In contrast, the local Finnish institutional investors, whom
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) base their disposition results on, do not appear to
be as sophisticated.
H. Dynamic Loss Aversion and Overconfidence
While our results cannot be traced to the explanations we have so far consid-
ered, they are consistent with the theories of dynamic loss aversion16 (Barberis,
Huang, and Santos (2001)) and overconfidence (Barber and Odean (2001)).
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) show that if i) investors receive utility
from changes in the value of their financial wealth and not just from consump-
tion; ii) investors are loss averse (i.e., they are more sensitive to losses in financial
wealth than to gains); and iii) they become more loss averse if their previous
investment results have been poor, then investors can exhibit the kind of perfor-
mance dependence uncovered in this paper. These investors take on more risk
following gains because the prior gains cushion the effects of any future losses,
and they cut back on risk following losses because after being burnt by the initial
loss, they are more sensitive to additional setbacks. While Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001) leverage on features central to the prospect theory of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979), their predictions sharply differ from those of the disposition
effect because they do not assume that investors integrate outcomes from sequen-
tial gambles. Their conclusions dovetail with the risk-taking behavior of Cornell
students in gambling experiments (Thaler and Johnson (1990)) and of television
game show participants (Gertner (1993)). In addition, their model simultaneously
explains the equity premium, volatility, and predictability puzzles in finance. To
our best knowledge, this is the first study that documents evidence from financial
16This is also commonly referred to as the “house money” effect (Thaler and Johnson (1990)).
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TABLE 3
Logit Regressions on Sell versus Hold Decision and Sell versus Buy Decision
Table 3 reports, in each panel, maximum likelihood regression coefﬁcients and t-statistics (in parentheses) for 10 Logit regressions, each regression corresponding to a currency. In Panels A and B, the dependent
variable is based on a dummy variable that obtains the value of one when an investor sells a currency. Each sell is matched with all the currencies in the investor’s portfolio that are not sold the same day. In
these “hold” events, the dummy variable obtains the value of zero. All same-day trades on the same currency are netted. In Panels C and D, the dependent variable is an analogously deﬁned dummy that takes
a value of one for “sell” events and a value of zero for “buy” events. The independent variables include lags of currency returns (with positive and negative returns represented separately) and two capital loss
dummies associated with small and large capital losses. Currency returns for day 0, −1,−2,−3,−4, [−19,−5], [−39,−20], [−59,−40], [−119,−60], [−179,−120], and [−239,180] are included among
the regressors, as in Table 1 of Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001). Only the coefﬁcient estimates and t-statistics for the loss dummies are reported for brevity. ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively.
Independent Danish Norwegian Swedish Swiss British Australian Japanese New Zealand Canadian
Variables Kroner Krone Krona Franc Pound Dollar Yen Dollar Dollar Euro
Panel A. All Funds (dependent variable: Sell vs. Hold dummy)
Large loss dummy −0.015** 0.014* 0.026** 0.135** 0.039** 0.083** 0.153** 0.032** 0.046** 0.043**
(loss> median loss) (−3.59) (2.08) (5.86) (23.62) (7.26) (16.97) (28.75) (5.14) (9.62) (8.07)
Small loss dummy 0.013** 0.022** 0.031** 0.112** 0.056** 0.022** 0.104** 0.038** 0.031** 0.135**
(loss≤ median loss) (5.06) (5.66) (11.06) (32.35) (17.79) (7.36) (30.64) (10.47) (10.66) (41.68)
Panel B. Pure Currency Fund (dependent variable: Sell vs. Hold dummy)
Large loss dummy −0.022* −0.006 0.039** 0.137** 0.059** 0.006 0.206** 0.024* 0.035** 0.018
(loss> median loss) (−2.17) (−0.53) (3.95) (13.06) (5.43) (0.57) (20.79) (2.00) (3.54) (1.87)
Small loss dummy 0.005 0.004 0.027** 0.045** 0.048** −0.011 0.084** 0.016* 0.016** 0.104**
(loss≤ median loss) (0.80) (0.70) (4.34) (6.67) (7.63) (−1.72) (13.45) (2.28) (2.64) (17.44)
Panel C. All Funds (dependent variable: Sell vs. Buy dummy)
Large loss dummy −0.077* 0.032 0.297** 0.100** 0.268** 0.184** 0.175** 0.325** 0.165** 0.043**
(loss> median loss) (−2.42) (0.45) (16.59) (8.02) (38.02) (16.88) (25.70) (10.91) (13.98) (8.83)
Small loss dummy 0.133** 0.192** 0.231** 0.110** 0.251** 0.207** 0.141** 0.310** 0.287** 0.196**
(loss≤ median loss) (7.34) (3.07) (20.24) (14.52) (59.93) (28.58) (33.63) (18.30) (36.55) (70.02)
Panel D. Pure Currency Fund (dependent variable: Sell vs. Buy dummy)
Large loss dummy −0.147 0.157 0.320** 0.083** 0.335** 0.169** 0.207** 0.247** 0.040 0.076**
(loss> median loss) (−1.55) (1.69) (12.03) (4.86) (29.01) (9.71) (19.13) (6.28) (1.85) (8.28)
Small loss dummy 0.073 0.264** 0.212** 0.091** 0.264** 0.205** 0.146** 0.259** 0.137** 0.181**
(loss≤ median loss) (1.17) (3.56) (12.77) (8.70) (38.35) (18.45) (22.28) (11.87) (8.10) (33.79)
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markets consistent with the Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) model of dynamic
loss aversion.
We argue that institutional fund managers are prone to dynamic loss aver-
sion precisely because a large part of their self-esteem and industry standing is
tied to their portfolios’ past performance. According to Barberis, Huang, and
Santos (2001), investors are loss averse because they may interpret a loss as a
sign that they are second rate investors, dealing their ego a painful blow, and
they may feel humiliated in front of friends when the word leaks out. Institu-
tional investors are more likely than retail investors to care about whether they
are viewed as “second rate investors.” Just as we expect a defense attorney to be
fairly adept at cross-examining witnesses and building cases, we also expect a
fund manager to be fairly skilled at investing. It is therefore more humiliating for
a fund manager to be labeled “a second rate investor” than for a retail investor
(e.g., a lawyer) to be labeled as such. Further, unlike professional investors who
trade for their own accounts (e.g., CBOT traders), institutional investors manage
“other people’s money,” so their shortcomings are more apparent than is true for
private investors. Institutional investors’ past performance records are often pub-
licly available, either through fund prospectuses or data vendors. Hence, it is more
likely that the “word leaks out” to friends and acquaintances in the industry when
institutional managers perform badly. Consequently, institutional managers are
more likely than individual investors to derive utility from past performance and
to be loss averse.
If the results are driven by dynamic loss aversion, then we would also expect
that losses matter more at the end of the calendar year, since fund performance is
typically evaluated at annual horizons. For example, a mutual fund is often evalu-
ated on the spread between the fund’s annual return (measured over the calendar
year) and the return on its benchmark. Losses near the end of the calendar year
translate more swiftly to embarrassment for a fund manager. To gauge the sen-
sitivity of the performance dependence to calendar time, we stratify the results
by calendar time. That is, we plot separate impulse response functions for each
half of the calendar year. The impulse response functions evaluate the risk-taking
response to a gain and to a loss. The results from this exercise are displayed in
Figure 7 and indicate that while the effects of gains do not differ substantially be-
tween calendar halves, the effects of prior losses are much stronger in the second
half than in the first half of the calendar year. Gains in both halves elicit mild in-
creases in risk, while only losses in the second half induce strong and statistically
significant reductions in risk. These results are consistent with the view that the
institutional risk reaction to prior losses is driven by dynamic loss aversion.
The risk reaction to gains is also consistent with an overconfidence explana-
tion (Barber and Odean (2001), Glaser and Weber (2007)). If institutional man-
agers are overconfident, prior gains may cause them to misattribute their success
to their own abilities and to take on more risk as a result. To further test the over-
confidence story, we gauge the sensitivity of the performance dependence to fund
age and trading experience. According to Barber and Odean (2000) and Dhar
and Zhu (2006), older and more experienced retail investors are less overconfi-
dent than their younger and less seasoned counterparts. Hence, if the risk reaction
to gains is driven by overconfidence, then we should find that it attenuates with
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FIGURE 7
Fund Panel Impulse Response Functions for the First and Second Half of the Calendar Year
The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. The sample is split into the ﬁrst half of the year (H1) and the
second half of the year (H2). To generate the Cholesky orthogonalized impulse response functions, risk is regressed on
daily lags of risk, daily lags of P&L conditional on gains, and daily lags of P&L conditional on losses for each fund, for each
subsample. The regression allows for heteroskedasticity across funds and uses the same lag structure as the VARs in
Figure 3. The vertical axes are scaled in standard deviation units of risk. The dotted lines sketched around each function
are 90% conﬁdence interval bounds based on maximum likelihood standard errors.
age and trading experience. To check this, we divide the sample into a formation
period (January 1995 to December 1999) and an evaluation period (January 2000
to December 2002). We define fund age as the number of days since the first trad-
ing day in the formation period, and define trading experience as the number of
trading days in the formation period. Then, we employ a simple two-step pro-
cedure. First, the sensitivity of each fund to lagged P&L is measured across the
evaluation period via equations (1) and (2) with weekly lags. We use the weekly
version of the regressions, as the positive relationship between P&L and risk (see
Figure 3) extends beyond the first daily lag. Second, the cross-section of coeffi-
cients for the first weekly lag of P&L is regressed on fund age and trading ex-
perience. Only funds that are live at some point in the formation period and that
have at least two years of holdings data in the evaluation period are included in
the analysis. This gives us a sample of 178 funds, of which 63 are pure currency
funds.
Table 4 reports the sensitivity of the coefficients on the first lag of PNL, the
first lag of POSPNL, and the first lag of NEGPNL to fund age and trading ex-
perience. Fund age and trading experience17 exert mitigating effects on the net
profit coefficient at the first lag. These effects are statistically significant at the
17Of course, young and inexperienced funds do not necessarily employ young and inexperienced
managers. Privacy issues with the State Street Bank custody dataset prevent us from conditioning
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5% level for the full sample and statistically significant at the 10% level for the
currency funds sample. We find that, for both the full sample and pure currency
funds sample, these mitigating effects are driven mainly by the risk reaction to
gains. Young and inexperienced funds increase risk more after a gain than old
and seasoned funds. Moreover, this pattern is statistically significant at the 5%
level for both fund samples. Perhaps reflecting an increased tendency for the dis-
position effect amongst younger and less experienced funds (see Odean (1998)),
the coefficient estimates on NEGPNL indicate that younger and less experienced
funds also cut risk less after a loss, though this effect is not statistically significant
at the 10% level. Note that while the unconditional reaction to losses dominates
the unconditional reaction to gains (see Figure 5), there is no requirement that the
risk reaction to losses is more sensitive to age and experience than is the risk re-
action to gains. Indeed, because of the attenuation effect of age and experience on
behavioral biases like overconfidence and disposition, one could argue from the
results of the sensitivity analysis18 that the risk reaction to gains is consistent with
the overconfidence story expounded by Barber and Odean (2001) and Gervais and
Odean (2001), while the risk reaction to losses is inconsistent with the disposition
effect.
TABLE 4
Sensitivity of Performance Dependence to Fund Age and Trading Experience
Table 4 illustrates the sensitivity of performance dependence to fund age and trading experience. The sample is from
January 1995 to December 2002. The sample is split into an evaluation period (January 2000 to December 2002) and
a formation period (January 1995 to December 1999). Fund age is proxied by the length of time since the ﬁrst day of
trading in the formation period. Fund experience is proxied by the number of trading days in the formation period. To test
sensitivity to these variables, we use a simple two-step procedure. In step one, the sensitivity of each fund to the ﬁrst
weekly lagged P&L (PNL), lagged P&L conditional on a gain (POSPNL), or lagged P&L conditional on a loss (NEGPNL) is
measured separately over the evaluation period. In step two, the cross-section of coefﬁcients is regressed separately on
standardized fund age and trading experience. Only funds that are live at some point in the formation period and that have
at least two years of holdings data in the evaluation period are included in the analysis. This gives us 178 funds, of which
63 are pure currency funds. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively.
Dependent Variable: Coefﬁcient on
Independent
Variable PNL(t− 1) POSPNL(t− 1) NEGPNL(t− 1)
Panel A. Full Sample
Fund age −5.71* −12.46** 4.94
(−2.53) (−3.09) (1.46)
Fund experience −5.67* −12.30** 5.02
(−2.52) (−3.05) (1.48)
Panel B. Pure Currency Fund Sample
Fund age −7.29 −17.32* 7.17
(−1.93) (−2.36) (1.07)
Fund experience −6.68 −16.13* 7.83
(−1.76) (−2.18) (1.18)
directly on the age and experience of the manager. Since our use of fund age and experience is likely
to introduce noise to the analysis, it is remarkable that we still obtain significant results.
18One concern is that our approach is not robust to the errors in variables problem. This is because
the P&L betas used in the cross-sectional regression are themselves estimated. To allay such concerns,
we also estimate the equation (2) regression augmented with the interaction of fund age and trading
experience with P&L. Our inferences do not change with this alternative specification.
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V. Implications for Prices
The performance dependence results become more interesting if they have
implications for future prices. In Section V we explore the effects of prior institu-
tional gains and losses on currency prices. The results in Section III indicate that,
conditional on an initial long position, institutional investors will be eager to buy
following gains and eager to sell following losses. The effects are reversed con-
ditional on an initial short position. If institutions take liquidity when they trade,
then the P&L on long positions minus the P&L on short positions may positively
forecast returns. Since the effects of gains on risk-taking are weaker than those
of losses, then P&L on long positions minus P&L on short positions should more
positively forecast returns when conditioning on losses than when conditioning on
gains. Moreover, any changes in returns should subsequently reverse themselves,
as they are not driven by changes in fundamentals. To test this, we estimate the
following regression:
RETk,t= a +
L∑
LAG=1
bLAGRETk,t−LAG +
L∑
LAG=1
cLAGPPNLk,t−LAG(6)
+
L∑
LAG=1
dLAGNPNLk,t−LAG + εk,t,
where RETk,t is daily currency return for currency k at day t, PPNLk,t is the differ-
ence between the sum of daily P&L on long positions and the sum of daily P&L
on short positions, conditional on gains, and NPNLk,t is the analogous difference,
conditional on losses. Both PPNLk,t and NPNLk,t are scaled by the past 60-day
moving average of dollar trading volume on currency k so as to better assess the
impact on currency returns.19 The underlying intuition is that for currencies with
higher trading volume, a greater dollar increase in risk-taking is needed to gener-
ate the same impact on returns. Note that conditional on all positions being long
positions, PPNL and NPNL are just the POSPNL and NEGPNL variables defined
in Section III.B, respectively, but scaled by trading volume. As in the previous
analysis, we present results from maximum likelihood regressions allowing for
groupwise (grouped by currency) heteroskedasticity. Since our a priori intuition
suggests that the return implications of risk-taking are likely to be ephemeral in
nature, we focus on regressions with the maximum daily lag L set at one day and
at five days. For completeness, we also perform univariate regressions with daily
return as the dependent variable and with the first daily lags of PPNL and NPNL
as independent variables.
The coefficient estimates on the PPNL and NPNL variables are reported in
Table 5 for both the full sample of funds and the pure currency funds sample. The
univariate regression estimates indicate that consistent with our intuition, both
PPNL and NPNL positively forecast the next day’s currency return. Moreover, the
19We thank the referee for this excellent suggestion. We also try scaling P&L with the past 240-day
moving average of trading volume and obtain qualitatively similar results.
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return implications of NPNL are stronger than those of PPNL. Perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, when we include controls for past returns in the regressions, the coefficient
estimate on the first lag of PPNL often loses its statistical significance, while that
on the first lag of NPNL maintains its statistical significance. For the full sample,
the coefficient estimates from the equation (6) regression with a maximum lag of
one day indicate that a unitary increase in PPNL induces a 10.1 bp increase in cur-
rency return the next day, while an increase in NPNL by the same amount induces
a 13.3 bp increase in currency return the next day. Both these effects are statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level. Since the standard deviation in daily currency re-
turns is 59.4 bps while that for NPNL is 0.159, a one-standard-deviation increase
in losses20 (scaled by trading volume) precipitates a 3.6% standard deviation or
2.1 bp decrease in currency return the next day as institutions reduce risk-taking in
the wake of those losses. In addition, the negative coefficient estimates on PPNL
and NPNL in the regressions with a maximum lag of five days suggest that these
performance dependence effects start to dissipate within a week,21 consistent with
them not being driven by changes in fundamentals. It is also noteworthy that the
effects of performance dependence on prices are even stronger with the pure cur-
rency funds sample. In addition, we note that while the past performance and
risk-taking relationship appears to extend beyond a few weeks, the past perfor-
mance and price relationship is much more transient (extending not more than a
week). One possible reason for this dissonance is that the market anticipates and
quickly prices in the actions of institutional investors even though flows take time
to materialize. For example, if the market experiences a surge in demand for a
currency, it may anticipate further demand for that currency going forward. This
may occur whether or not the market is aware of the impetus for the additional
demand, which in our case arises from changes in risk-taking amongst institu-
tions. Indeed such a phenomenon has been documented by Froot, O’Connell, and
Seasholes (2001), who show that international equity prices are bid up in antici-
pation of future international equity flows. When those flows fail to materialize,
returns fall.
To gauge the economic significance of the impact of past institutional P&L
on currency prices, we evaluate the returns from simple long- and short-trading
strategies based on PPNL and NPNL. Every day, we sort our set of 10 currencies
by yesterday’s PPNL or NPNL. Then, we buy the top N currencies and short the
bottom N currencies where N ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Our set of long/short strategies are
reminiscent of those investigated by Okunev and White (2003) and Neely, Weller,
and Dittmar (1997). For each strategy, we report the annualized return, the asso-
ciated t-statistic, the information ratio, and the percentage of days where return is
greater than zero. To adjust for risk, we take as a benchmark the equally-weighted
average return of the 10 currencies (following Okunev and White (2003)) and
evaluate the alphas of the strategies relative to that benchmark. As with the pre-
vious analysis, we present results for the full sample of funds and for the pure
20An increase in losses implies a decrease in NPNL and vice versa.
21In results not reported, we replicate the analysis in Table 5 with weekly variables and confirm that
the price impact dissipates within a week. None of the weekly PPNL and NPNL lags reliably predict
weekly currency returns.
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TABLE 5
Regressions on Daily Currency Returns
Table 5 reports maximum likelihood coefﬁcient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) for regressions on daily currency percentage return for the currency panel from January 1995 to December 2002. The
independent variables are L lags of PPNL, NPNL, and currency return. PPNL is aggregated currency P&L conditioned on gains and scaled by past-60-day moving average of currency volume. NPNL is aggregated
currency P&L conditioned on losses and scaled by past-60-day moving average of currency volume. Aggregated P&L is the difference between the sum of P&L across all long positions and the sum of P&L across
all short positions in the currency. The standard errors allow for groupwise (grouped by currency) heteroskedasticity. ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Full Sample of Funds Pure Currency Funds Sample
with Currency Return Lags with Currency Return Lags
Univariate max lag L = 1 max lag L = 5 Univariate max lag L = 1 max lag L = 5
PPNL(t− 1) 0.086** 0.068 0.101* 0.065 0.080 0.290** 0.202 0.219 0.198 0.071
(3.19) (1.72) (2.50) (1.49) (1.73) (3.01) (1.62) (1.76) (1.45) (0.48)
PPNL(t− 2) −0.018 0.021 −0.186 −0.085
(−0.41) (0.44) (−1.37) (−0.57)
PPNL(t− 3) 0.039 0.078 −0.037 0.159
(0.88) (1.68) (−0.27) (1.06)
PPNL(t− 4) −0.040 0.005 −0.046 0.042
(−0.92) (0.12) (−0.34) (0.28)
PPNL(t− 5) 0.028 0.041 0.273* 0.397**
(0.63) (0.89) (1.99) (2.66)
NPNL(t− 1) 0.102** 0.108** 0.133** 0.138** 0.164** 0.462** 0.501** 0.509** 0.587** 0.671**
(3.92) (2.78) (3.32) (3.18) (3.60) (4.81) (3.97) (4.02) (4.24) (4.44)
NPNL(t− 2) −0.007 0.031 −0.059 0.083
(−0.16) (0.69) (−0.43) (0.54)
NPNL(t− 3) −0.062 −0.033 −0.239 −0.188
(−1.43) (−0.73) (−1.72) (−1.23)
NPNL(t− 4) −0.126** −0.085 −0.038 0.073
(−2.91) (−1.85) (−0.27) (0.48)
NPNL(t− 5) 0.102* 0.134** 0.047 0.014
(2.35) (2.93) (0.33) (0.09)
R 2 0.0004 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 0.0008 0.0010 0.0019 0.0023 0.0005 0.0009 0.0005 0.0010 0.0012 0.0015 0.0017 0.0026
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currency funds sample. We also report separate results for the first half and sec-
ond half of the sample period to evaluate the performance of the strategies over
time.
The performance attributes reported in Table 6 reveal that simple P&L-based
strategies can achieve annualized returns of greater than 7% over the sample
period. Further, such returns are statistically significant at the 1% level for all
strategies with N > 1. Equally impressive are the information ratios that come
close to, or exceed, one. Again, this is especially true for strategies where N > 1.
Consistent with the stronger risk reaction to losses documented in Section III,
the returns from strategies based on losses are higher than those from strategies
based on gains. For instance, the NPNL-based strategy over the full sample with
N=1 achieves a return of 10.73% per year (t-statistic = 2.59), while the analogous
PPNL-based strategy achieves a return of 7.39% per year (t-statistic = 1.82). Risk
does not appear to explain the high returns. The estimated alphas from the one-
factor model are all very similar to the annualized returns, suggesting that the
betas with the equally-weighted currency return benchmark are low in magni-
tude. Turning to the performance of the portfolios over the sample period, we find
that the strategies perform better in the second half of the sample period than in
the first half. All 12 of the long/short strategies generate statistically significant
returns (at the 5% level) in the second half, while only three strategies generate
statistically significant performance (at the 5% level) in the first half. One view
is that the State Street data better capture institutional investor trades in the sec-
ond half of the sample period. Another view is that the influence of institutional
investors as a group in foreign exchange markets has grown.
One caveat, however, is that the strategies typically require very high
turnover, since the portfolios are rebalanced daily. Consequently, the returns
reported in Table 6 may not survive adjustments for transactions costs. For ex-
ample, the annual turnover for the NPNL-based strategy over the full sample
with N = 3 is 146.75.22 That is, the long/short portfolio is turned over 146.75
times over the course of a year or once over the course of 1.63 days. Assuming a
round-trip transactions cost of 5 bps (as in Levich and Thomas (1993) and Osler
and Chang (1995)), this implies that transactions cost reduces annualized returns
by 14.7%.23 Clearly, the portfolio returns may not survive the high transactions
costs associated with daily rebalancing.24 Nonetheless, the analysis in Table 6
suggests that information on past institutional P&L may be useful for enhancing
strategies in foreign exchange space. More importantly, the results indicate that
past institutional P&L impacts prices in an economically significant way and
complement those of Coval and Shumway (2005) and Frazzini (2006), who show
that behavioral biases have implications for prices.
22The annual turnover figures for the other strategy portfolios are similar in magnitude. The analysis
assumes that there are 240 trading days in a year.
23Note that the transactions costs associated with turning over the long and short portfolio once is
10 bps.
24To reduce turnover, we experimented with strategies based on past week PPNL and NPNL. None
of these strategies generated statistically significant returns, consistent with the documented transient
impact of P&L on prices (see Table 5).
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TABLE 6
Simple Long- and Short-Trading Strategies Based on Past P&L
Every day, the 10 currencies in the sample are sorted based on yesterday’s aggregate P&L scaled by the past-60-day moving average of volume. Performance attributes from three strategies are reported. The
ﬁrst strategy buys the top currency and shorts the bottom currency. The second strategy buys the top two currencies and shorts the bottom two currencies. The third strategy buys the top three currencies and
shorts the bottom three currencies. Alpha is measured relative to the equal-weighted return average of the 10 currencies. Aggregate P&L is the sum of P&L for all long positions minus the sum of P&L for all short
positions. In Panels A and B, P&L is summed across all funds. In Panels C and D, P&L is summed across all pure currency funds. The sample period is from January 1995 to December 2002. The t-statistics are
in parentheses. ** and * indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Buy Top, Short Bottom Currency Buy Top 2, Short Bottom 2 Currencies Buy Top 3, Short Bottom 3 Currencies
Full Sample 1st 2nd Full Sample 1st 2nd Full Sample 1st 2nd
Period Half Half Period Half Half Period Half Half
Panel A. Full Sample of Funds (currencies sorted on yesterday’s P&L/volume conditional on a gain)
Annualized return (%) 7.39 1.50 13.26* 9.50** 5.03 13.96** 8.96** 7.39* 10.52**
(1.82) (0.27) (2.26) (3.13) (1.16) (3.31) (3.59) (2.05) (3.04)
Annualized alpha (%) 7.15 1.26 13.05* 9.33** 4.77 13.85** 8.87** 7.28* 10.45**
(1.76) (0.22) (2.24) (3.09) (1.10) (3.29) (3.55) (2.02) (3.02)
Information ratio 0.62 0.13 1.09 1.06 0.55 1.59 1.22 0.98 1.46
% of days> 0 50.89 49.26 52.52 51.37 51.56 51.18 52.38 52.33 52.42
Panel B. Full Sample of Fund (currencies sorted on yesterday’s P&L/volume conditional on a loss)
Annualized return (%) 10.73** 5.82 15.63** 10.01** 9.77* 10.26* 8.94** 6.70 11.18**
(2.59) (0.98) (2.72) (3.18) (2.14) (2.36) (3.46) (1.78) (3.17)
Annualized alpha (%) 10.81** 6.20 15.55** 10.12** 10.03* 10.27* 9.03** 6.89 11.21**
(2.62) (1.05) (2.71) (3.22) (2.20) (2.36) (3.50) (1.83) (3.17)
Information ratio 0.88 0.47 1.31 1.08 1.03 1.13 1.18 0.85 1.52
% of days> 0 51.51 50.02 53.00 51.13 51.75 50.50 51.46 51.66 51.27
Panel C. Currency Funds Sample (currencies sorted on yesterday’s P&L/volume conditional on a gain)
Annualized return (%) 7.03 2.94 11.12* 9.94** 8.24* 11.64** 7.82** 6.03 9.61**
(1.78) (0.52) (2.00) (3.55) (2.08) (2.94) (3.34) (1.83) (2.88)
Annualized alpha (%) 6.71 2.46 10.92* 9.76** 7.96* 11.53** 7.67** 5.83 9.50**
(1.71) (0.44) (1.98) (3.50) (2.02) (2.92) (3.28) (1.78) (2.86)
Information ratio 0.60 0.25 0.96 1.21 1.00 1.41 1.13 0.88 1.38
% of days> 0 51.22 50.22 52.23 51.27 51.27 51.27 52.57 54.54 50.60
Panel D. Currency Funds Sample (currencies sorted on yesterday’s P&L/volume conditional on a loss)
Annualized return (%) 10.13* 7.03 13.23* 8.15** 7.05 9.24* 7.36** 4.75 9.97**
(2.51) (1.20) (2.37) (2.81) (1.69) (2.30) (3.11) (1.40) (3.02)
Annualized alpha (%) 10.25* 7.60 13.11* 8.26** 7.31 9.27* 7.43** 4.88 10.00**
(2.54) (1.31) (2.35) (2.86) (1.76) (2.31) (3.14) (1.44) (3.02)
Information ratio 0.85 0.58 1.14 0.96 0.81 1.10 1.06 0.67 1.45
% of days> 0 51.03 49.64 52.42 50.12 49.93 50.31 51.90 51.66 52.14
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VI. Conclusion
In classical finance theory, behavioral biases neither affect risk-taking behav-
ior nor have any implications for prices. This paper challenges that view on both
counts. In contrast to the prevailing literature on individuals (retail investors and
professional traders), we show that large institutions are not prone to the disposi-
tion effect. Instead, they take on more risk following gains and scale back on risk
following losses. Our results are not driven by mechanical relationships, hedging
activities, capital constraints, stop-loss rules, momentum trading, herding, or man-
agerial career concerns. Instead, they are consistent with dynamic loss aversion
and overconfidence. To our best knowledge, we are the first to provide market evi-
dence supporting the dynamic loss aversion model of Barberis, Huang, and Santos
(2001). Moreover, the performance dependence has economically and statistically
significant implications for future prices. Because institutional investors are more
eager to cut risk following losses, the losses from long versus short positions neg-
atively forecasts the next day’s currency return. Conversely, because institutional
investors are more eager to increase risk following gains, the gains from long
versus short positions positively forecast the next day’s currency return. These
price effects are not driven by fundamentals, as they start to dissipate within a
week.
Appendix. Currency Transactions
To see how the various types of active and passive spot and forward transactions are
represented in our data, it is worthwhile to look at some sample trades. Table A1 shows
some hypothetical foreign exchange transactions of the kind that appear in our database25
Fund A buys $1 million of underlying Japanese government bonds (JGBs) in July 2003
and sells them in December 2003. In order to actually settle the funds for the JGB, the
spot transactions shown in Panel A of Table A1 are executed. If the fund decides to pas-
sively hedge the currency exposure implicit in the JGB holding using Fund B as an over-
lay manager, it will result in the transactions shown in Panel B of Table A1. There, a
100% hedged position is initiated by selling the full amount of yen out to three months
in the forward market. In October, the hedging position is rolled forward by just over two
months using a foreign exchange swap. In December, when the JGB is sold, the hedge
is lifted using a closing spot trade. Since the yen appreciated over the period, there is a
currency gain on the holding of the JGB equal to $90,956.54. The hedging trades offset
most of this, since collectively they lose $85,549.07. The example in Panel C of Table A1
is more straightforward. There, Fund C wishes to take an active position in the Mexican
peso in July 2003 and does so by means of an outright forward contract. In August, the
peso position is closed using a spot trade, generating a loss of $48,271.36 due to peso
depreciation.
In seeking to understand the relationship between risk-taking and past gains and
losses, active currency trades are of the most relevance, since they are independently
motivated. In other words, it is the kind of trades conducted by Fund C that we wish to
focus on. Unfortunately, our database contains no information on whether a trade is active
or passive. This means that it is not possible to distinguish between the spot trades of
25Note that these hypothetical trades are dated after the end of our sample. We do this to make
transparent the fact that we treat the actual trades in our database with full confidentiality.
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TABLE A1
Hypothetical Foreign Exchange Trade Records
Table A1 shows examples of the hypothetical trade records in our database. Fund A purchases yen in the spot market in
order to buy an underlying asset (e.g., a Japanese government bond) on 7/17/2003. Fund B then hedges the currency
exposure of Fund A passively using a 100% hedge ratio and a three-month forward contract. On 10/8/2003, the hedging
position is swapped forward by another two months. On 12/16/2003, the fund sells the underlying, and closes the passive
currency hedged. Fund C uses a forward contract to take exposure to the Mexican peso for one month.
Currency Currency Amount Transaction
Fund Bought Sold Bought Amount Sold Trade Date Value Date Type FX P&L
Panel A. Spot Transactions Associated with Purchase of Underlying Asset
Fund A JPY USD 117,370,000.00 1,000,000.00 15-Jul-03 17-Jul-03 Spot } 90,596.54Fund A USD JPY 1,090,596.54 117,370,000.00 16-Dec-03 18-Dec-03 Spot
Panel B. Passive Hedging Transactions by Overlay Manager Associated with Fund A
Fund B USD JPY 1,003,068.94 117,370,000.00 15-Jul-03 15-Oct-03 Forward }Fund B JPY USD 117,370,000.00 1,072,033.69 08-Oct-03 15-Oct-03 } Swap –85,549.07Fund B USD JPY 1,074,113.56 117,370,000.00 08-Oct-03 18-Dec-03
Fund B JPY USD 117,370,000.00 1,090,697.89 16-Dec-03 18-Dec-03 Spot
Panel C. Outright Exposure to Currency
Fund C MXN USD 20,944,000.00 2,000,000.00 15-Jul-03 14-Aug-03 Forward } –48,271.36Fund C USD MXN 1,951,728.64 20,944,000.00 12-Aug-03 14-Aug-03 Spot
Funds A, B, and C, nor between the forward trades of Funds B and C, even though they are
motivated by very different considerations. For this reason, we do not work at the trade-
by-trade level, as is often done in the literature. Instead, we sum up all open positions held
by a fund to yield aggregate holdings series that reflect net exposure in each currency. For
example, the trades conducted by Fund B in Table A1 give rise to a net short position of
117,370,000 yen over the period from July 15, 2003 to December 16, 2003. The discounted
dollar value of this short yen position, which we sign negatively and which varies from day
to day with the yen/dollar forward exchange rate and the U.S. interest rate, is the aggregate
holdings series we focus on. Importantly, however, the trades of Funds A and B contained
in this aggregation are unlikely to bias our results in any way, as discussed in the main
text.
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